Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0063-0zbMath1131.91004OpenAlexW2070394913MaRDI QIDQ878164

Jian Yu, Yong-Hui Zhou, Shu-wen Xiang

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0063-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (15)

Topological essentiality in infinite games ⋮ ON THE EXISTENCE OF BERGE'S STRONG EQUILIBRIUM ⋮ Existence and generic stability of cooperative equilibria for multi-leader-multi-follower games ⋮ Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules ⋮ Hadamard well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core ⋮ On strategic stability in discontinuous games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Essential equilibria of large generalized games ⋮ Stability of fixed points of set-valued mappings and strategic stability of Nash equilibria ⋮ A Hausdorff metric inequality with applications to the existence of essential components ⋮ Essential stability of \(\alpha \)-core ⋮ On the stability of solutions for the generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems via free-disposal set ⋮ Existence and stability of the \(\alpha\)-core for fuzzy games ⋮ Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games ⋮ Stable analysis of solution set for system of quasivariational relations with applications

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On essential sets and essential components of efficient solutions for vector optimization problems
• Essential equilibria of \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
• Essential components of the set of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium points
• Essential component and essential optimum solution of optimization problems
• Stability of solutions for Ky Fan's section theorem with some applications
• On essential components of the set of Nash equilibrium points
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• The Stability of Ky Fan's Points
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points

This page was built for publication: Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies