Formation of segregated and integrated groups

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0064-zzbMath1131.91003OpenAlexW3122889545MaRDI QIDQ878165

Alison Watts

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12171/files/wp060127.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players ⋮ STRUCTURAL HOMOPHILY ⋮ Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation ⋮ Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Second best taxation as a game
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Stability in coalition formation games
• Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• NP-completeness in hedonic games
• Negatively interdependent preferences
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures

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