The formateurs' role in government formation

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0102-xzbMath1114.91035OpenAlexW2036495432MaRDI QIDQ878394

Eyal Winter, Elan Pavlov, Daniel J. Seidmann

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0102-x

zbMATH Keywords

Sequential bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (3)

Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting ⋮ A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability ⋮ Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

Cites Work

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Agenda control in coalition formation
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• A Structural Model of Government Formation

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