Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
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Publication:878397
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0104-8zbMath1114.91043OpenAlexW2071208786MaRDI QIDQ878397
Publication date: 26 April 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/4431
Related Items (7)
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations ⋮ Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations ⋮ Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
Cites Work
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- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
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