Unobservable contracts as precommitments

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0111-9zbMath1114.91074OpenAlexW2131132120MaRDI QIDQ878404

Levent Koçkesen

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0111-9

zbMATH Keywords

Strategic delegationUnobservable contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (2)

Privatization, incentive delegation and foreign direct investment ⋮ Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Unobserved Delegation
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation

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