Corruption and auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.04.002zbMath1142.91490OpenAlexW3124714076MaRDI QIDQ881984

Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 23 May 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionscorruption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts, Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer, Interim bribery in auctions, Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions

Cites Work

• On favoritism in auctions with entry
• Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design