On managerial decision problem of the auction sites

DOI10.1007/S11424-006-0340-9zbMath1160.91345OpenAlexW1967994651MaRDI QIDQ882519

Kin Keung Lai, Jun Ma, Shou-Yang Wang

Publication date: 24 May 2007

Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-006-0340-9

zbMATH Keywords

secondary marketauction sitesauction with commissions and penaltiesoptimal reserve

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Note on “Guarantees in Auctions: The Auction House as Negotiator and Managerial Decision Maker”
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Guarantees in Auctions: The Auction House as Negotiator and Managerial Decision Maker
• Combining Buy-In Penalties with Commissions at Auction Houses

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