Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

DOI10.1007/S10058-006-0014-ZzbMath1160.91373OpenAlexW1986787233MaRDI QIDQ882553

Cécile Aubert, Jérôme Pouyet

Publication date: 24 May 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/13654

zbMATH Keywords

incentivescollusionmarket competitionincomplete regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains

Cites Work

• Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information

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