Binary effectivity rules

DOI10.1007/S10058-006-0012-1zbMath1160.91329OpenAlexW2050837054MaRDI QIDQ882555

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Keiding

Publication date: 24 May 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp378.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

von Neumannsocial choice correspondenceseffectivity functionsMorgenstern solutionsNakamura's number

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Representation of constitutions under incomplete information ⋮ Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: a complete character\-ization

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