Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
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Publication:882556
DOI10.1007/s10058-006-0013-0zbMath1160.91328OpenAlexW2032739501MaRDI QIDQ882556
Publication date: 24 May 2007
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0013-0
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Cites Work
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- Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
- The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
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