The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

DOI10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3zbMath1137.91384OpenAlexW1490275441MaRDI QIDQ883201

Nicholas Bardsley, Peter G. Moffatt

Publication date: 31 May 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityvoluntary contributionsaltruismfinite mixture modelstobittrembles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (11)

Experience in public goods experiments ⋮ Explaining cooperative behavior in public goods games: how preferences and beliefs affect contribution levels ⋮ Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study ⋮ Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting ⋮ Multiple motives of pro-social behavior: evidence from the solidarity game ⋮ The econometric modelling of social preferences ⋮ Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence ⋮ Leadership and the effective choice of information regime ⋮ Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences ⋮ Expected utility theory and prospect theory: One wedding and a decent funeral ⋮ Identifying types in contest experiments

Cites Work

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• The geometry of mixture likelihoods: A general theory
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• Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Strength of the social dilemma in a public goods experiment: An exploration of the error hypothesis

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