Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria

DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9020-4zbMath1137.91322OpenAlexW2012524168MaRDI QIDQ883204

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 31 May 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9020-4

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionequilibrium refinementdiscountingrepeated gamepower indexconflictstubbornness incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-PERIOD-DEPENDENT DEGRADED MULTISTATE RELIABILITY SYSTEMS

Cites Work

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• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Theory of Moves
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
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