Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation

From MaRDI portal
Publication:884296

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2006.07.006zbMath1112.92044OpenAlexW2142283420WikidataQ38403619 ScholiaQ38403619MaRDI QIDQ884296

Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof, Christine Taylor, Martin A. Nowak

Publication date: 13 June 2007

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3279757



Related Items

Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations, Interaction patterns and coordination in two population groups: a dynamic perspective, Average abundance function of multi-player threshold public goods without initial endowment evolutionary game model under differential aspiration levels and redistribution mechanism, Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations, Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations, From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive, Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games, Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games, Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term, The evolution of generalized reciprocity in social interaction networks, The institution as a blunt instrument: cooperation through imperfect observability, Dynamics in atomic signaling games, Network formation games with teams, The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model, An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game, The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game, The characteristics of average abundance function of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism, Average payoff-driven or imitation? A new evidence from evolutionary game theory in finite populations, On the stochastic evolution of finite populations, Quasi-neutral evolution in populations under small demographic fluctuations, Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions, Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population, Building a synthetic basis for kin selection and evolutionary game theory using population genetics, Social relationship adjustments within the same sex promote marital bliss, Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on signed networks based on structural balance theory, The effect of the stake size on the evolution of fairness, Moran-type bounds for the fixation probability in a frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher model, Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection, Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games, Phenotype switching and mutations in random environments, Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration, Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement, Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents, Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games, Stochastic dynamics in the fitness-based process which can be on behalf of the standard Moran, local and Wright-Fisher processes, The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics, Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations, Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations, The evolution of bet-hedging adaptations to rare scenarios, Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity, Evolutionary games with affine fitness functions: applications to cancer, Evolutionary games on star graphs under various updating rules, Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process, Stochasticity, selection, and the evolution of cooperation in a two-level Moran model of the snowdrift game, An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics, Moran process and Wright-Fisher process favor low variability, Fixation times in deme structured, finite populations with rare migration, Evolutionary game based control for biological systems with applications in drug delivery, Random matching in adaptive dynamics, Effect of variability in payoffs on conditions for the evolution of cooperation in a small population, Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games



Cites Work