On robust constitution design

DOI10.1007/s11238-006-9017-zzbMath1121.91033OpenAlexW3121552241MaRDI QIDQ885072

Emmanuelle Auriol, Robert J. Gary-Bobo

Publication date: 7 June 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2415/1/auriol.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationmechanism designrepresentative democracycollective choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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