A mathematical analysis of public avoidance behavior during epidemics using game theory

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.002zbMath1325.91041OpenAlexW2052027417WikidataQ51402029 ScholiaQ51402029MaRDI QIDQ890709

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 11 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminfectious diseasessocial distancingcontact ratio

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Epidemiology (92D30) Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Social and behavioral sciences: general topics (91C99)

Related Items (10)

Self-isolation ⋮ Equilibria of an epidemic game with piecewise linear social distancing cost ⋮ Optimal epidemic control in equilibrium with imperfect testing and enforcement ⋮ Epidemics with behavior ⋮ Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic ⋮ Virus dynamics with behavioral responses ⋮ Iterated symmetric three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Two population three-player prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Disease control through voluntary vaccination decisions based on the smoothed best response ⋮ Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The saturating contact rate in marriage- and epidemic models
• Public avoidance and epidemics: insights from an economic model
• A First Course in Optimization Theory

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