Axioms of invariance for TU-games

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0458-2zbMath1388.91019OpenAlexW2087121928MaRDI QIDQ891333

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila

Publication date: 17 November 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2012-01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueaddition invarianceequal (surplus) division ruletransfer invariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach ⋮ Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value ⋮ Value-free reductions ⋮ Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions ⋮ Nullified equal loss property and equal division values ⋮ A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games ⋮ Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel ⋮ Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value

Cites Work

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• Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
• Associated consistency and values for TU games
• Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
• Collusion properties of values
• Associated consistency and Shapley value
• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
• Decomposition of the space of TU-games, strong transfer invariance and the Banzhaf value
• On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
• A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
• Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

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