A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8zbMath1388.91101OpenAlexW1966561534MaRDI QIDQ891336

Seok-ju Cho, John Duggan

Publication date: 17 November 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

Cites Work

• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

This page was built for publication: A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model