Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price

DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0461-7zbMath1388.91100OpenAlexW2154708932WikidataQ57920571 ScholiaQ57920571MaRDI QIDQ891338

Kalyan Chatterjee, Kaustav Das

Publication date: 17 November 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17878

zbMATH Keywords

competitionoutside optionsbilateral bargaininguniform price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market

Cites Work

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• Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
• Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
• Complexity and Competition

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