Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
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Publication:892181
DOI10.1016/J.IJAR.2015.02.002zbMath1415.91061OpenAlexW2006895989MaRDI QIDQ892181
Giuseppe De Marco, Maria Romaniello
Publication date: 18 November 2015
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2015.02.002
Related Items (4)
On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations ⋮ Ambiguous games without a state space and full rationality ⋮ On the convexity of preferences in decisions and games under (quasi-)convex/concave imprecise probability correspondences ⋮ Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
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