On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0891-6zbMath1341.91073OpenAlexW2031130905WikidataQ59429383 ScholiaQ59429383MaRDI QIDQ892845

Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0891-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey

Uses Software

• JBool

Cites Work

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