Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0899-YzbMath1341.91016DBLPjournals/scw/BrinkF15OpenAlexW954238337WikidataQ59404777 ScholiaQ59404777MaRDI QIDQ892847

René van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0899-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (19)

The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ A new basis and the Shapley value ⋮ Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property ⋮ On \(\alpha\)-constant-sum games ⋮ The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Hart--Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games ⋮ Discounted tree solutions ⋮ Recursive and bargaining values ⋮ A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values ⋮ The burning coalition bargaining model ⋮ The Efficient, Symmetric and Linear Values for Cooperative Games and Their Characterizations ⋮ New Characterizations of the Discounted Shapley Values ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games

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