Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0898-ZzbMath1341.91104OpenAlexW318900731MaRDI QIDQ892856

Vilen Lipatov, Alfons J. Weichenrieder

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0898-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility
• Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective
• Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments*
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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