Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?

DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0840-9zbMath1341.91036OpenAlexW2250082935MaRDI QIDQ892860

Marc Willinger, Estelle Midler, Charles Figuières

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02806611

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
• Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games.
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma

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