Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
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Publication:892863
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0841-8zbMath1341.91037OpenAlexW2043057859MaRDI QIDQ892863
Daan P. van Soest, Jan Stoop, Charles N. Noussair
Publication date: 12 November 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34067/1/MPRA_paper_34067.pdf
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Cites Work
- Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
- A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
- On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation
- Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
- Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems
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