Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
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Publication:892978
DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9467-7zbMath1377.91113OpenAlexW2272667972MaRDI QIDQ892978
Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Inés Moreno de Barreda, Gustavo Bergantiños
Publication date: 13 November 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/60780
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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