On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9468-6zbMath1377.91087OpenAlexW2043471611MaRDI QIDQ892988

Dan Qin

Publication date: 13 November 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9468-6

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremexternal similarity independenceindependence condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
• The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
• Information and preference aggregation
• Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules

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