Can priming cooperation increase public good contributions?

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9481-4zbMath1378.91047OpenAlexW2076851630MaRDI QIDQ893038

Robert Metcalfe, Nattavudh Powdthavee, Michalis Drouvelis

Publication date: 13 November 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pure-oai.bham.ac.uk/ws/files/18306312/Can_Priming_Cooperation_Increase_Public_Good_Contributions_TD_all_files.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

free ridingprimingpublic goods experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with induced emotions ⋮ Care and anger motives in social dilemmas

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production
• Key-minimal cryptosystems for unconditional secrecy
• Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
• Smoothness and Convex Area Functionals—Revisited
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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