Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
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Publication:893399
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.001zbMath1369.91051OpenAlexW1651216127MaRDI QIDQ893399
Rudolf Müller, Juan Carlos Carbajal
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.001
2-cycle monotonicityrevenue equivalencecyclic monotonicitymonotonic transformations in differencestruthful implementability
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