Dynamically consistent voting rules

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012zbMath1369.91052OpenAlexW1267729134MaRDI QIDQ893404

Madhav Chandrasekher

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessdynamic consistencyaggregation of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains

Cites Work

• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Voting under constraints
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions

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