A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005zbMath1369.91142OpenAlexW2152865367MaRDI QIDQ893408

Qinggong Wu

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingstwo-sided matchingmarriage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Stability in repeated matching markets ⋮ Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stable marriages and search frictions
• Decentralized job matching
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
• A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
• Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
• Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Marriage and Class
• The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search