Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.003zbMath1369.91113OpenAlexW2144774507MaRDI QIDQ893411

Son Ku Kim, Jin Yong Jung

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachprincipal-agent modellikelihood ratio variable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (9)

Relational contracts and the first-order approach ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ The informativeness principle without the first-order approach ⋮ Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach ⋮ Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

Cites Work

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• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
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• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Remarks on a Multivariate Transformation

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