A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.015zbMath1330.91151OpenAlexW2156576743MaRDI QIDQ894006

Jonathan Newton, Ryoji Sawa

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/9223

zbMATH Keywords

learningmatchingstochastic stabilitymarriagecollege admissions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Uses Software

• PRISM

Cites Work

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