Public information in Markov games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.018zbMath1330.91026OpenAlexW3123551658MaRDI QIDQ894007

Andrew Kloosterman

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.018

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationcollusionMarkov games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Comparison of Information Structures for Zero-Sum Games and a Partial Converse to Blackwell Ordering in Standard Borel Spaces

Cites Work

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• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games
• The value of information in a simple duopoly model
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• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
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• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Unnamed Item

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