Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.004zbMath1330.91133OpenAlexW1999433152MaRDI QIDQ894017

Jimmy Chan, Wenzhang Zhang

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

oligopolyrepeated gameprivate informationcollusionprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Private monitoring in auctions
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
• Folk theorem with communication
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Incentives in Teams
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Robust Collusion with Private Information
• Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

This page was built for publication: Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring