Matching markets under (in)complete information
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Publication:894021
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008zbMath1330.91150OpenAlexW2007071308MaRDI QIDQ894021
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/182476
Related Items (8)
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field ⋮ Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences ⋮ Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
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