Matching markets under (in)complete information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008zbMath1330.91150OpenAlexW2007071308MaRDI QIDQ894021

Jordi Massó, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/182476

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityincomplete informationmany-to-one matching market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field ⋮ Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences ⋮ Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition

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