Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010zbMath1330.91074OpenAlexW2103862640MaRDI QIDQ894024

Alexander Reffgen

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionsingle-peakednessspatial voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains ⋮ Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ Local incentive compatibility with transfers ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness ⋮ Social Choice Theory

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