Approachability with delayed information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.010zbMath1330.91046OpenAlexW2005809986MaRDI QIDQ894030

Ehud Lehrer, David Lagziel

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

approachabilitydelayed informationimperfect and asymmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (4)

Constrained no-regret learning ⋮ Observation delays in teams and effort cycles ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ A note on strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games

Cites Work

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• Internal Regret with Partial Monitoring. Calibration-Based Optimal Algorithms
• Approachability in a Two-person Game
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Approachability
• Calibration with Many Checking Rules

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