Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.018zbMath1330.91043OpenAlexW2127001565MaRDI QIDQ894045

Simone Galperti

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.018

zbMATH Keywords

signalcommon agencyinformed principaldelegation principleinscrutability principlemenu

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (1)

Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information

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