An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
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Publication:894059
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.02.007zbMath1330.91087DBLPjournals/jet/BalkenborgM15OpenAlexW2052671165WikidataQ57937040 ScholiaQ57937040MaRDI QIDQ894059
Dieter Balkenborg, Miltiadis Makris
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/375196/1/BalkenborgMakris.pdf
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (6)
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Interim third-party selection in bargaining ⋮ Selling with evidence
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- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
- Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
- Robust Mechanism Design
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