Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
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Publication:894069
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006zbMath1330.91111OpenAlexW2071460483MaRDI QIDQ894069
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006
bounded rationalityindivisible goodsequal-income competitive social choice functionssincere and sophisticated agents
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (5)
A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Divide and compromise ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
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