Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.008zbMath1347.91104OpenAlexW1955371898MaRDI QIDQ894607

Florian Lindner, Loukas Balafoutas, Matthias Sutter, Dmitry Ryvkin, E. Glenn Dutcher

Publication date: 2 December 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120981

zbMATH Keywords

experimentlearningtournamentcontractloserwinner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

How tournament incentives affect asset markets: a comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests ⋮ Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence ⋮ Tournament rewards and heavy tails ⋮ Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The nature of tournaments
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences

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