Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
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Publication:894621
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.009zbMath1347.91154OpenAlexW2197115769MaRDI QIDQ894621
Andreas Kleiner, Moritz A. Drexl
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74639
Related Items (12)
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget ⋮ Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes ⋮ Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Balanced ranking mechanisms ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ A simple budget-balanced mechanism ⋮ Optimal allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Taking turns
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