Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001zbMath1347.91109OpenAlexW2235866584WikidataQ56687822 ScholiaQ56687822MaRDI QIDQ894627

Melanie Parravano, Odile Poulsen

Publication date: 2 December 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationfocal pointlabelspayoff asymmetrystake size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining ⋮ Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points -- an experimental investigation ⋮ Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence ⋮ Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: an experimental investigation

Uses Software

• hroot

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes
• Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
• How Portable Is Level-0 Behavior? A Test of Level-k Theory in Games With Non-Neutral Frames

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