Spatial implementation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011zbMath1347.91127OpenAlexW4251229205MaRDI QIDQ894629

Christopher P. Chambers, Richard Lee Brady

Publication date: 2 December 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011

zbMATH Keywords

geometric medianNash implementationMaskin monotonicityEuclidean preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

A spatial analogue of May's theorem ⋮ A spatial analogue of May's theorem

Cites Work

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