Spatial implementation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894629
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011zbMath1347.91127OpenAlexW4251229205MaRDI QIDQ894629
Christopher P. Chambers, Richard Lee Brady
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Foundations of Optimization
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Note on the median of a multivariate distribution
This page was built for publication: Spatial implementation