Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
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Publication:894631
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.003zbMath1347.91155OpenAlexW1014540180MaRDI QIDQ894631
Jingfeng Lu, Matthew Gentry, Tong Li
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66100/
first price auctioninitial wealthmonotone equilibriumconstant absolute risk aversion (CARA)constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
Related Items (6)
How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
Cites Work
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