Reciprocal contracting
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Publication:896940
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.003zbMath1330.91028OpenAlexW4229961823MaRDI QIDQ896940
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.003
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples ⋮ Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games ⋮ Private communication in competing mechanism games
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