Complexity and repeated implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.002zbMath1330.91072OpenAlexW2145764653MaRDI QIDQ896948

Jihong Lee, Hamid Sabourian

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256850

zbMATH Keywords

complexityefficiencymixed strategiessubgame perfect equilibriumfinite mechanismsrepeated implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Approximate implementation in Markovian environments ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization

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