Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.001zbMath1330.91007OpenAlexW2201226501MaRDI QIDQ896957

Xavier Vives, Alessandro Pavan

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Proceedings of conferences of miscellaneous specific interest (00B25) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

Informed speculation with k-level reasoning ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly

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