Information and strategic behavior

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.005zbMath1330.91084OpenAlexW2052171884MaRDI QIDQ896964

Marek Weretka, Marzena Rostek

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionrational expectationsmarket designprice impactprice informativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Informed speculation with k-level reasoning ⋮ Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare ⋮ Market-making with search and information frictions ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ On the functional equivalence of two perfectly competitive economies with negative exponential utility and linear utility with a quadratic holding cost ⋮ Information, market power and welfare ⋮ Information linkages in a financial market with imperfect competition ⋮ Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations ⋮ Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals

Cites Work

• Partially-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• Price Inference in Small Markets
• Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
• Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information