Coordination with flexible information acquisition
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Publication:896978
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.017zbMath1330.91022OpenAlexW3125417776MaRDI QIDQ896978
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10104738/
Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (16)
The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications ⋮ Communication via intermediaries ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Strategic mistakes ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ Unrestricted information acquisition ⋮ Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer ⋮ Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games ⋮ Endogenous quantal response equilibrium ⋮ Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property ⋮ The price adjustment hazard function: evidence from high inflation periods ⋮ A note on rational inattention and rate distortion theory ⋮ Learning in crowded markets
Cites Work
- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
- Information Acquisition and Welfare
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
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